Abstract-We consider a finite horizon dynamic game with two players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as independent, controlled linear Gaussian processes and players incur quadratic instantaneous costs. This forms a dynamic linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) game with asymmetric information. We show that under certain conditions, players' strategies that are linear in their private types, together with Gaussian beliefs form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game. Furthermore, it is shown that this is a signaling equilibrium due to the fact that future beliefs on players' types are affected by the equilibrium strategies. We provide a backward-forward algorithm to find the PBE. Each step of the backward algorithm reduces to solving an algebraic matrix equation for every possible realization of the state estimate covariance matrix. The forward algorithm consists of Kalman filter recursions, where state estimate covariance matrices depend on equilibrium strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) team problems have been studied extensively under the framework of classical stochastic control with single controller and perfect recall [1, Ch.7] . In such a system, the state evolves linearly and the controller makes a noisy observation of the state which is also linear in the state and noise. The controller incurs a quadratic instantaneous cost. With all basic random variables being independent and Gaussian, the problem is modeled as a partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP). The belief state process under any control law happens to be Gaussian and thus can be sufficiently described by the corresponding mean and covariance processes, which can be updated by the Kalman filter equations. Moreover, the covariance can be computed offline, and thus, the mean (state estimate) is a sufficient statistic for control. Finally, due to the quadratic nature of the costs, the optimal control strategy is linear in the state. Thus, unlike most POMDP problems, the LQG stochastic control problem can be solved analytically and admits an easy-to-implement optimal strategy. LQG team problems have also been studied under nonclassical information structure such as in multi-agent decentralized team problems where two controllers with different information sets minimize the same objective. Such systems with asymmetric information structure are of special interest today because of the emergence of large scale networks such as social or power networks, where there are multiple decision makers with local or partial information about the system. It is well known that for decentralized LQG team problems, linear control policies are not optimal in general [2] . However, there exist special information structures, such as partially nested [3] and stochastically nested [4] , where linear control is shown to be optimal. Due to their strong appeal for ease of implementation, linear strategies have been studied on their own for decentralized teams even at the possibility of being suboptimal (e.g. see [5] and references therein).
When controllers (or players) are strategic, the problem is classified as a dynamic game and an appropriate solution concept is some notion of equilibrium. When players have different information sets, such games are called games with asymmetric information. There are several notions of equilibrium for such games, including perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), sequential equilibrium, trembling hand equilibrium [6] , [7] . Each of these notions of equilibrium consists of a strategy and a belief profile of all players where the equilibrium strategies are optimal given the beliefs and the beliefs are derived from the equilibrium strategy profile and using Bayes' rule (whenever possible), with some equilibrium concepts requiring further refinements. Due to this circular argument of beliefs being consistent with strategies which are in turn optimal given the beliefs, finding such equilibria is a difficult task. To date, there is no known sequential decomposition methodology to find such equilibria for general dynamic games with asymmetric information.
Authors in [8] studied a discrete-time dynamic LQG game with one step delayed sharing of observations. Authors in [9] studied a class of dynamic games with asymmetric information under the assumption that player's posterior beliefs about the system state conditioned on their common information are independent of the strategies used by the players in the past. Due to this independence of beliefs and past strategies, the authors of [9] were able to provide a backward recursive algorithm similar to dynamic programming to find Markov perfect equilibria [10] of a transformed game which are equivalently a class of Nash equilibria of the original game. The same authors specialized their results in [11] to find nonsignaling equilibria of dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information.
Recently, we considered a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information and independent private types in [12] and provided a sequential decomposition methodology to find a class of PBE of the game considered. In our model, beliefs depend on the players' strategies, so our methodology allows the possibility of finding signaling equilibria. In this paper, we build on this methodology to find signaling equilibria for two-player dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information. We show that players' strategies that are linear in their private types in conjunction with consistent Gaussian beliefs form a PBE of the game. Our contributions are: (a) Under strategies that are linear in players' private types, we show that the belief updates are Gaussian and the corresponding mean and covariance are updated through Kalman filtering equations which depend on the players' strategies, unlike the case in classical stochastic control and the model considered in [11] . Thus, there is signaling [13] . (b) We sequentially decompose the problem by specializing the forward-backward algorithm presented in [12] for the dynamic LQG model. The backward algorithm requires, at each step, solving a fixed point equation in 'partial' strategies of the players for all possible beliefs. We show that in this setting, solving this fixed point equation reduces to solving a matrix algebraic equation for each realization of the state estimate covariance matrices. (c) The cost-to-go value functions are shown to be quadratic in the private type and state estimates, which together with quadratic instantaneous costs and mean updates being linear in the control action, implies that at every time t player i faces an optimization problem which is quadratic in her control. Thus, linear control strategies are shown to satisfy the optimality conditions in [12] . (d) For the special case of scalar actions, we provide sufficient algorithmic conditions for existence of a solution of the algebraic matrix equation. (e) Finally, we present numerical results on the steady state solution for specific parameters of the problem.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we define the model. In Section III, we introduce the solution concept and summarize the general methodology in [12] . In Section IV, we present our main results where we construct equilibrium strategies and belief through a forward-backward recursion. In Section V, we discuss existence results and present numerical steady state solutions. We conclude in Section VI.
A. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables and lowercase for their realizations. We use bold upper case letters for matrices. For any variable, subscripts represent time indices and superscripts represent player identities. We use notation −i to represent the player other than player i. We use notation a t:t to represent vector (a t , a t+1 , . . . a t ) when t ≥ t or an empty vector if t < t. We remove superscripts or subscripts if we want to represent the whole vector, for example a t represents (a a probabilistic strategy of player i, where
,2 be a strategy profile of both players. The distribution of the basic random variables and their independence structure, together with the system evolution in (1) and players strategy profile g, define a joint distribution on all random variables involved in the dynamical process. The objective of player i is to maximize her total expected cost
With both players being strategic, this problem is modeled as a dynamic LQG game with asymmetric information and with simultaneous moves.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the equilibrium concept for dynamic games with asymmetric information and summarize the general methodology developed in [12] to find a class of such equilibria.
if the denominator is 0. The belief update can be summarized as π
, whereF is independent of players' strategy profile g. The SPBE of the game can be found through a two-step backward-forward algorithm. In the backward recursive part, an equilibrium generating function θ is defined based on which a strategy and belief profile (β * , µ * ) are defined through a forward recursion. In the following we summarize the algorithm and results of [12] .
1) Backward Recursion: An equilibrium generating function θ = (θ i t ) i=1,2,t∈T and a sequence of value functions
where expectation in (7) is with respect to random variables (x
From the equilibrium generating function θ defined though this backward recursion, the equilibrium strategy and belief profile (β * , µ * ) are defined as follows. 2) Forward Recursion: (a) Initialize at time t = 1,
The strategy and belief profile (β * , µ * ) thus constructed form an SPBE of the game [12, Theorem 1].
IV. SPBE OF THE DYNAMIC LQG GAME In this section, we apply the general methodology for finding SPBE described in the previous section, on the specific dynamic LQG game model described in Section II. We show that players' strategies that are linear in their private types in conjunction with Gaussian beliefs, form an SPBE of the game. We prove this result by constructing an equilibrium generating function θ using backward recursion such that for all Gaussian belief vectors
and satisfies (7) . Based on θ, we construct an equilibrium belief and strategy profile.
The following lemma shows that common beliefs remain Gaussian under linear deterministic γ t of the form γ 
, given by (5), is also Gaussian distribution with mean x i t+1 and covariance Σ i t+1 , wherê
where (11), such that
We also say,
The previous lemma shows that with linear deterministic γ is linear inx i t and the control action u i t . Furthermore, these updates are given by appropriate Kalman filter equations. It should be noted however that the covariance update in (11b) depends on the strategy through γ i t and specifically through the matrix L i t . This specifically shows how belief updates depend on strategies on the players which leads to signaling, unlike the case in classical stochastic control and the model considered in [11] . Now we will construct an equilibrium generating function θ using the backward recursion in (6)- (8) . The θ function generates linear deterministic partial functions γ t , which, from Lemma 1 and the fact that initial beliefs (or priors) are Gaussian, generates only Gaussian belief vectors (π for the whole time horizon. These beliefs can be sufficiently described by their mean and covariance processes (x 1 t , Σ 1 t ) t∈T and (x 2 t , Σ 2 t ) t∈T which are updated using (11). For t = T + 1, T, . . . , 1, we define the vectors
with V i t (Σ t ) and ρ i t (Σ t ) as appropriately defined matrix and scalar quantities, respectively.
Proof: We construct such a θ function through the backward recursive construction and prove the properties of the corresponding value functions inductively.
and for π t = (π 
Since T i , P i are symmetric by assumption,V i t is also symmetric.
For ease of exposition, we will assume i = 1 and for player 2, a similar argument holds. At time t, the quantity that is minimized for player i = 1 in (7) can be written as
The inner expectation can be written as follows, wherẽ γ
2 Under certain conditions, stated in the proof. 
where V . This minimization can be performed component wise leading to a deterministic policỹ γ
t is positive definite 3 . In that case, the unique minimizer u (12) . Thus, (21c) is equivalent to (7) and with a similar analysis for player 2, it implies thatL i t is solution of the following algebraic fixed point equation,
In addition,m t can be found from (21c) as 3 This condition is true if the instantaneous cost matrix R i is positive definite, and can be proved inductively in the proof by showing that V i t andV i t are positive definite.m
x t (23b) =:M txt =:
Finally, the resulting cost for player i is,
where,F
SinceV i t is symmetric, so is V i t . Thus the induction step is completed.
Taking motivation from the previous theorem and with slight abuse of notation, we definẽ
and sinceγ
whereL i t does not depend onx t andm i t is linear inx t and is of the formm i t =M i txt . Now we construct the equilibrium strategy and belief profile (β * , µ * ) through the forward recursion in (9)-(10c), using the equilibrium generating function θ ≡ (θ L , θ m ).
(a) Let µ * ,i 
constructed above is a PBE of the dynamic LQG game.
Proof: The strategy and belief profile (β * , µ * ) is constructed using the forward recursion steps (9)-(10c) on equilibrium generating function θ, which is defined through backward recursion steps (6)- (8) implemented in the proof of Theorem 1. Thus the result is directly implied by Theorem 1 in [12] .
V. DISUSSION

A. Existence
In the proof of Theorem 1,D u1 † tV 1 tD u1 t is assumed to be positive definite. This can be achieved if R i is positive definite, based on which, it can be easily shown inductively in the proof of Theorem 1 that the matrices V Constructing the equilibrium generating function θ involves solving the algebraic fixed point equation in (22) for L t for all Σ t . In general, the existence is not guaranteed, as is the case for existence ofγ t in (7) for general dynamic games with asymmetric information. At this point, we don't have a general proof for existence. However, in the following lemma, we provide sufficient conditions on the matrices A 
is positive definite, where
Proof: See Appendix II.
B. Steady state
In Section III, we presented a backward/forward methodology to find SPBE for finite time-horizon dynamic games, and specialized that methodology in Section IV, to find SPBE for dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information, where equilibrium strategies are linear in players' types. It requires further investigation to find the conditions for which the backward-forward methodology could be extended to infinite time-horizon dynamic games, with either expected discounted or time-average cost criteria, which could be useful to characterize steady state behavior of these games (one sufficient set of conditions with finite action and state spaces is presented in [16] ). Specifically, for time homogenous dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information (where matrices A i , B i are time independent), under the required technical conditions for which such a methodology is applicable, the steady state behavior can be characterized by the fixed point equation in matrices (22) and (25), where the time index is dropped in these equations, i.e. for i = 1, 2,
Observe that in the above equations, matrices V i andV i do not appear as functions of Σ, as was the case in the finite horizon scenario described in (17), (22) and (25b), in the proof of Theorem 1. The reason is as follows. The steady state behavior for a general dynamic game with asymmetric information and independent types, if it exists, would involve fixed point equation in value functions (V i (·)) i . However, for the LQG case, it reduces to a fixed point equation in (V i (Σ)) i , i.e. value functions evaluated at a specific value of Σ. This is so because the functions V i are evaluated at Σ and φ(Σ, L), which at steady state are exactly the same (see (29a)). As a result, the fixed point equation reduces to the three algebraic equations, as shown above, with the matrices Σ, L,V and V as variables. This represents a significant reduction in complexity.
1) Numerical examples: In this section, we present numerically found solutions for steady state, assuming that our methodology extends to the infinite horizon problem for the parameters considered. We assume B i = 0 which implies that the state process (X 
there exists a symmetric solution as, for i = 1, 2, 
It is interesting to note that for player 1, where A 1 does not weigh the two components equally, the corresponding L 1 is full rank, and thus reveals her complete private information. Whereas for player 2, where A 2 has equal weight components, the corresponding L 2 is rank deficient, which implies, at equilibrium player 2 does not completely reveal her private information. Also it is easy to check from (11b) that with full rank L i matrices, steady state Σ i = Q i .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study a two-player dynamic LQG game with asymmetric information and perfect recall where players' private types evolve as independent controlled Markov processes. We show that under certain conditions, there exist strategies that are linear in players' private types which, together with Gaussian beliefs, form a PBE of the game. We show this by specializing the general methodology developed in [12] to our model. Specifically, we prove that (a) the common beliefs remain Gaussian under the strategies that are linear in players' types where we find update equations for the corresponding mean and covariance processes; (b) using the backward recursive approach of [12] , we compute an equilibrium generating function θ by solving a fixed point equation in linear deterministic partial strategies γ t for all possible common beliefs and all time epochs. Solving this fixed point equation reduces to solving a matrix algebraic equation for each realization of the state estimate covariance matrices. Also, the cost-to-go value functions are shown to be quadratic in private type and state estimates. This result is one of the very few results available on finding signaling perfect Bayesian equilibria of a truly dynamic game with asymmetric information.
